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Street-level Enforcement Style: A Multidimensional Measurement Instrument
Noortje de Boer
Department of Public Administration and Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This study investigates street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement style and its underlying dimensions by
developing and validating amultidimensional measurement scale. Developing ameasurement scale for
enforcement style is relevant because the number of underlying dimensions is contested and studies
developing measurement scales are scarce. This complicates cross-sector and cross-national compar-
isons. Using a survey among inspectors of the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety
Authority, street-level enforcement style is found to comprising three dimensions: (1) legal, (2) facilita-
tion, and (3) accommodation. This study contributes to more validated measurement instruments by
presenting a 13-item measure that can be used to study street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement style.
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Introduction
What happens at the frontlines of policy implementation
has long been at the center of public management and
public administration research (Hupe, Hill, & Buffat,
2016; Lipsky, 2010). Scholars increasingly address spe-
cific attitudes, capabilities, decision-making processes,
and motivational dynamics of street-level bureaucrats
to better understand street-level dynamics (Etienne,
2014; May & Wood, 2003; Maynard-Moody &
Musheno, 2000). A diverse range of street-level beha-
viors are studied, such as policy alienation (Tummers,
2012; van Engen, 2017b; van Engen, Tummers, Bekkers,
& Steijn, 2016), coping (Tummers, Bekkers, Vink, &
Musheno, 2015), and uncertainty experiences
(Raaphorst, 2018). An explicit focus on enforcement at
the street is, however, missing from this debate (May &
Wood, 2003). This is surprising because street-level
enforcement is increasingly addressed by regulation
scholars (Lo, Fryxell, & van Rooij, 2009; Mascini &
Wijk, 2009; May & Winter, 1999, 2000; May & Wood,
2003; Nielsen, 2007).
Street-level enforcement is better understood as
enforcement style of individual street-level bureaucrats.
Enforcement style concerns how street-level bureaucrats,
such as inspectors or police officers, enforce at the street
during interactions with inspectees (May & Winter,
1999, 2000). Street-level enforcement style is, thus, a
type of attitude of street-level bureaucrats during
inspectee-encounters which can differ depending on
the situation at hand. When enforcement style is studied,
it is generally understood to be two-dimensional (May &
Winter, 1999, 2000; May & Wood, 2003). May & Winter
(2011), contrastingly, highlight that there could be even
more dimensions. This multidimensionality, however,
has barely been further explored (Lo et al., 2009). On
top of that, scholars generally agree that street-level
bureaucrats have different enforcement styles during
exactly the same inspectee-encounter, but what makes
up these different styles remains unclear (Etienne, 2014;
Nielsen, 2015; Mascini & Wijk, 2009; Winter & May,
2002). It, thus, remains unclear how many dimensions
underlie street-level enforcement style and how they are
composed (May & Winter, 2011).
This study sets out to address this multidimensional
nature of street-level enforcement style and the
dimensions underlying it through measurement scale
development and validation. Existing studies using
measurement scales to study street-level enforcement
style are scarce (e.g. Lo et al., 2009; May & Winter,
2000), based on qualitative or mixed-method research
(e.g. Mascini & Wijk, 2009; Nielsen, 2015) or are tested
among inspectees rather than street-level bureaucrats
themselves (e.g. May & Winter, 2000). More impor-
tantly, these studies use scales created ad hoc and, thus,
for the specific purposes of the respective studies. These
scales are valuable, but rarely follow all measurement
development steps, such as generating–and reviewing
an item pool, or running extensive statistical tests for
reliability and validity (DeVellis, 2016; van Engen,
2017a). Measurement-development steps ensure valid
and reliable scales that allows for cross-sector and
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cross-national comparisons. This, ultimately, contri-
butes to a better understanding of street-level enforce-
ment style which is crucial because the style of
enforcing has implications for the implementation of
public policies, street-level bureaucrats’ interactions
with—and treatment of inspectees and, ultimately, the
legitimacy of government (Lipsky, 2010).
Therefore, this article investigates: What dimen-
sions underlie street-level enforcement style and how
can they be measured? by developing as well as vali-
dating a multidimensional measurement scale for
street-level enforcement style. This study investigates
a specific type of street-level bureaucrats, namely
inspectors. Inspectors are suitable to study because
they have considerable autonomy and discretion
when enforcing rules and regulations and while
interacting with inspectees. They are, thus, classic
street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010; May & Wood,
2003). However, inspectors work for rule-enforcing
organizations focused on delivering obligations by
catching and punishing wrong-doers during interac-
tions with inspectees (Sparrow, 2000) making them
very powerful street-level bureaucrats (Raaphorst,
2018).
This article is structured as follows. First, the concep-
tual foundations of enforcement style will be discussed.
Second, the empirical part is based on a survey (n = 507)
among Dutch inspectors. It reports steps taken for scale
development and assesses the psychometric properties
using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis and
validity tests. Third, results are presented and discussed
with regard to their theoretical contributions as well as
how scholars and practitioners may benefit from them in
terms of understanding and executing policy
implementation.
Theoretical framework
The inspector
Street-level bureaucrats’ autonomy and discretion
for delivering obligations and interacting with
inspectees set the stage for their ways of inspecting
at the street-level (Nielsen, 2015; Sparrow, 2000).
Street-level bureaucrats are defined as “public
service workers who interact directly with citizens
in the course of their job, and who have substantial
discretion in the execution of their work” (Lipsky,
2010, p. 3). Inspectors implement public policies
with considerable autonomy and discretion during
inspectee interactions and are, therefore, classic
street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010). The imple-
mentation strategies of the public organizations that
employ inspectors determine what to enforce, how
to enforce, and when to enforce (May & Burby,
1998; May & Winter, 2000; Sparrow, 2000). These
organizational boundaries partly determine the
parameters within which inspectors can make judg-
ments about the application of enforcement policies
during on-site visits with inspectees (Nielsen, 2015;
Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). Hence, within
these parameters, inspectors have their own discre-
tionary room to behave as they see fit during reg-
ulatory encounters (May & Winter, 2000; May &
Wood, 2003).
Inspectors, however, also have distinct characteristics.
First, most street-level bureaucrats like—teachers, social
workers, and physicians—deliver services to clients.
Inspectors, however, deliver obligations to inspectees
(Sparrow, 2000). Regulators and their inspectors set out
to minimize social risks by detecting wrongdoers and
punishing them accordingly. By using sanctions,
inspectors, thus, limit their inspectees freedom of acting
the way they want (Baldwin, Scott, & Hood, 1998;
Sparrow, 2000). Second, whereas some street-level
bureaucrats often interact with vulnerable inspectees, like
social clients or the unemployed (Lipsky, 2010), inspectors
mainly interact with a heterogeneous clientele, such as
powerful corporations (Braithwaite, 2003; Nielsen, 2015).
Third, the inspectees do not have a choice when interact-
ing with inspectors, because there is no exit option
(Nielsen, 2015). When an inspector fines a bar owner
for violating smoking regulations, for example, this
inspectee does not want this interaction and cannot
choose to exit it. Inspectees, therefore, often view the
intervening interactions with inspectors as unwanted
since their intention is to detect criminal behavior and
punish accordingly (Nielsen, 2015; Winter & May, 2015).
In sum, inspectors are powerful (Raaphorst, 2018)
because they limit inspectees’ freedom and interactions
are obligatory and unavoidable.
Defining enforcement style
Street-level enforcement consists of enforcement
actions and enforcement style. Notably, enforcement
style is also frequently used to study the ways of enfor-
cing of regulatory agencies (e.g. Braithwaite, Walker, &
Grabosky, 1987; Carter, 2017; McAllister, 2010). In this
article, however, street-level bureaucrats and not the
regulatory agency are the unit of analysis. Both enfor-
cement actions and enforcement style are related
because they address the behavior of street-level
bureaucrats during the enforcement process, although
they are conceptually different (May & Winter, 2000).
Enforcement actions address behavioral activities
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conducted by street-level bureaucrats before and after a
public encounter. They include, for instance, finalizing
sanctions, specifying specific indicators that are
inspected, or the planning of day-to-day inspectee-
encounters, and executing accompanied administrative
tasks (May & Winter, 2000). Enforcement actions are
enforcement tasks that a street-level bureaucrat exe-
cutes before s/he visits inspectees and which are, thus,
not directly related to the behavior of a specific
inspectee.
The behavior of street-level bureaucrats, however,
also has a relational dimension because they implement
policies during inspectee interactions (de Boer, Eshuis,
& Klijn, 2018; de Boer and Eshuis, in press; Maynard-
Moody & Musheno, 2000; Pautz, 2010). Bruijn, Ten
Heuvelhof, & Koopmans (2007) highlight that enfor-
cing regulations is inherently a game between the
inspector and the inspectee. The relational attitude of
inspectors during these interactions is captured in their
enforcement style. Enforcement style is defined as “the
character of the day-to-day interactions of [street-level
bureaucrats] when dealing with regulated entities” (May
& Winter, 2000, p. 145). During these face-to-face
interactions, street-level bureaucrats behave a certain
way toward inspectees, predominantly focusing on
implementing enforcement policies but also giving
advice or tips on how to improve compliance. In
sum, the most important difference between enforce-
ment action and style is that the latter is relational
coming to light during face-to-face encounters with
inspectees but the departure point for decision-making
remains the rules that street-level bureaucrats need to
enforce (May & Winter, 2000). The focus here is solely
on street-level enforcement style.
Understanding enforcement style
There is a general agreement that street-level enforcement
style is not fixed, and street-level bureaucrats combine
different elements in varying constellations depending on
the situation at hand (Mascini, 2013; Pautz, 2010). On top
of that, street-level bureaucrats have a different style of
enforcement during the same inspectee-encounter
(Etienne, 2014; Nielsen, 2015; Mascini & Wijk, 2009;
May & Winter, 2000). The way these enforcement style
variations are studied, however, differs. Scholars differ in
whether enforcement style is understood to vary along on
one or along multiple dimensions (Kagan, 1994; Lo et al.,
2009; May & Winter, 1999, 2000; May & Wood, 2003;
Reiss, 1984). Traditionally, enforcement style was concep-
tualized as being one-dimensional. The single dimension
concerned the rigidness of applying rules (May & Wood,
2003). To illustrate, Kagan (1994) emphasizes that street-
level bureaucrats vary in style from being cooperative to
more punitive. Reiss (1984) highlights that styles vary
from accommodative to more deterrent and sanctioning.
Scholars, however, have pointed out that one dimension
with two polar opposites—ranging from more coopera-
tive to punitive—is not enough to grasp the complex
nature of street-level enforcement style (Braithwaite
et al., 1987; Gormley, 1998; May & Burby, 1998).
Indeed, May & Winter (1999) empirically revealed
that enforcement style varied along not one but two
dimensions, specifically formalism1 and coercion.
May & Winter (2000) define formalism as “the degree
of rigidity in interactions that varies from informal
conversations and rule-bound instances on the part of
the [street-level bureaucrats]” (p. 147) and coercion
as “the willingness to issue threats that vary from a
trusting inspector not issuing warnings, to a skeptical
[street-level bureaucrat] threatening to report or to
impose penalties for violations” (p. 147). While Kagan
(1994) conceptualized both dimensions on one
dimension—the punitive dimension—May & Winter
(1999); May & Winter (2000) argue that they should
be separated because street-level bureaucrats can vary
in the extent to which they internalize each. Put
differently, May & Winter (1999; 2000) show that
both dimensions can be present—in different
degrees—simultaneously which results in different
patterns of enforcement styles. Three ideal types of
street-level bureaucrat enforcement style were identi-
fied, namely: (1) legalistic (high formalism, moderate
coercion); (2) flexible (moderate formalism and
coercion); and (3) accommodative (low formalism
and coercion). May & Winter (2000) thus show that
enforcement style is composed of two dimensions and
the combination in which they are applied at the
street-level result in different enforcement styles of
street-level bureaucrats.
May & Wood (2003) also see street-level enforcement
style as two-dimensional, but they use slightly different
labels than May & Winter (1999); May & Winter (2000).
They empirically show that street-level enforcement style
consists of (1) formalism and (2) facilitation which
replaces the coercion dimension of May & Winter
(1999); May & Winter (2000). In line with May &
Winter (1999, 2000), formalism is understood as rigidly
applying rules and regulations. Facilitation is defined as
“the willingness of [street-level bureaucrats] to help
regulatees and be forgiving” (May & Wood, 2003, p.
1999). This two-dimensional nature of enforcement
style has now become widely accepted and used to
study the frontline enforcement behavior of street-level
bureaucrats (e.g. Mascini & Wijk, 2009; May & Wood,
2003; Nielsen, 2015).
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In a later reflection on their own work, May & Winter
(2011) point out that there could be more than two
dimensions. Surprisingly, this notion has not been further
explored. When enforcement style at the street-level is
discussed, the traditional two-dimensional understanding
of enforcement style remains the main conceptualization
(e.g. Carter, 2017; Yee, Tang, & Lo, 2014; Zhan, Lo, &
Tang, 2013). One notable exception is the work of Lo
et al. (2009) who do build on the idea of a multidimen-
sional enforcement style and, thus, make an important
contribution to the understanding of street-level
enforcement style. Lo et al. (2009) conceptualize that
enforcement style is constructed of five underlying
dimensions.
The first two dimensions of Lo et al.’s (2009) multi-
dimensional concept include May &Winter’s (1999) iden-
tified formalism and coercion. First, formalism stresses the
attention paid to the rigidness of the law during interac-
tions by being reserved and legal-oriented (Lo et al., 2009;
May &Winter, 1999, 2000; May &Wood, 2003). Examples
of the formal dimension would be putting an emphasis on
a firm implementation of rules and regulations and not
considering mitigating circumstances of inspectees (Lo
et al., 2009). Second, coercion focuses on the force of the
law and, thus, the willingness of street-level bureaucrats to
issue and signal threats (Lo et al., 2009; May & Winter,
1999, 2000). Street-level bureaucrats focusing on coming
across as an authority, keeping inspectees on their toes and
making threats adhere to the coercive dimension of
enforcement style.
Third, educational highlights the communicative
aspect of the law (Lo et al., 2009). Street-level bureau-
crats encounter numerous inspectees who did not
intend to break laws, but merely do not understand
them because they are too complex and exhaustive
(e.g. Nielsen, 2015). Focusing on informing and educat-
ing inspectees during interactions are examples fitting
the educational enforcement style dimension. Fourth,
prioritization entails pragmatic enforcement. Street-
level bureaucrats applying this dimension are focused
on prioritizing contextual circumstances on the one
hand, like the inspectees’ cooperation, while on the
other hand also focusing on being effective at the
same time (Lo et al., 2009). Prioritizing during inspec-
tee encounters is, thus, concerned with placing more
emphasis on contextual circumstances and being
effective than on other elements—like informing
inspectees (Tummers et al., 2015). Finally, accommoda-
tion emphasizes “the reconciliation of the demands of
key stakeholders in regulatory enforcement” (Lo et al.,
2009, p. 2710). Street-level bureaucrats, thus, consider
the opinions of other stakeholders like colleagues or
supervisors (Lo et al., 2009; Maynard-Moody &
Musheno, 2000). Notably, this dimension slightly dif-
fers from the other four. Street-level bureaucrats cannot
emphasize the opinions of others during inspectee
encounters but, merely, keep them at the back of their
mind.
The five dimensions of enforcement style are sum-
marized in Table 1. This table provides a definition for
each dimension to clarify the conceptual differences
between each dimension. Also, an example of an atti-
tude fitting each dimension is given. It is important to
note that at the street-level, street-level bureaucrats can
employ one or combinations of the enforcement style
dimensions depending on the inspectee they are inter-
acting with. None of the enforcement dimensions are
likely to be present solely in their pure form. Instead,
street-level bureaucrats will combine different degrees
of multiple dimensions of enforcement styles during
interactions with inspectees which, ultimately, results
in their street-level enforcement style (Lo et al., 2009;
Mascini & van Wijk, 2009; May & Winter, 2000; May &
Wood, 2003).
Table 1. Five dimensions of street-level bureaucrats’ enforce-
ment style.
Concept Dimension
Dimension
definition† Example†
Enforcement
style
Formalism The emphasis a
street-level
bureaucrat puts on
rigid legal
requirements
during interactions
with inspectees
An inspector
emphasizing
strict
requirements that
must be met by
the inspectee
Coercion The emphasis a
street-level
bureaucrat puts on
issuing threats
during inspectee
interactions
An inspector
threatening the
inspectee with
issuing a sanction
Educational The emphasis a
street-level
bureaucrat puts on
educating a client
during inspectee
interactions
An inspector
explaining rules
and regulations
to the inspectee
Prioritization The emphasis a
street-level
bureaucrat puts on
being effective
considering
contextual
constrains during
inspectee
interactions
An inspector not
considering the
mitigating
circumstances of
the inspectee
Accommodation The extent to
which a street-level
bureaucrat takes
opinions of other
stakeholders into
account during
inspectee
interactions
An inspector
taking opinions
of colleagues in
his/her team into
account when
interacting with
the inspectee
† Note: Definitions and examples are inspired by and adapted from Lo et al.
(2009) and May & Winter (1999); May & Winter (2000).
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Measuring enforcement style
Lo et al. (2009) took the first important step to further
advance the dimensions that underlie street-level enfor-
cement style. There are, however, limitations. First and
foremost, Lo et al. (2009) test their enforcement style
dimensions in an Asian context, specifically China.
Understanding non-Western contexts is, indeed, lacking
from the regulatory enforcement literature and, thus,
very important (Rooij, Fryxell, Lo, & Wang, 2013).
However, encounters between inspectors and those
they regulate is context-depended (Mascini, 2013). In
this line of reasoning, there are differences between the
Chinese regulatory context and other contexts, such as
the West (Rooij et al., 2013; Zhan et al., 2013; Zhang,
2016). Due to these cultural differences, it could very
well be that the street-level enforcement style dimensions
also differ in a Western context. The Western context,
specifically the Dutch context, is central in this article.
Second, Lo et al. (2009) create their scales ad hoc and do
not follow measurement development steps (DeVellis,
2016; van Engen, 2017b). For example, no cognitive
interviews are conducted to ensure that the dimensions
and their operationalization resonate with inspectors.
Likewise, no exploratory and confirmatory steps are
taken to gain a deeper understanding of the way the
five dimensions are made up.
Method
Case
The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety
Authority (NVWA) was selected as a case for this
research. The NVWA is one of the largest Dutch
inspectorates with the core responsibility of overseeing
food and product safety to ensure that public health
and animal welfare are up to standard. This case was
selected because the NVWA has been under a lot of
pressure over the past decade due to several media
outrages. Reforming the way the NVWA and its inspec-
tors enforce has often been suggested as a way to
combat such large-scale debacles as well as the risks
for the public (Posthumus, 2015; Weel, 2017).
Data
An online survey was distributed among inspectors
between October and November 2016 at the NVWA.
Respondents were guaranteed full anonymity and
confidentiality. Only inspectors from the divisions
Veterinary and Import, Agriculture and Nature and
Consumer and Safety (n = 1201) were included,
because face-to-face inspection visits are not central to
other divisions. A total response rate of 56.5% was
achieved (n = 679). A total of 172 respondents were
excluded from analysis because they filled in less than
50% of the questionnaire. The total sample, thus,
consists of 507 respondents.
This sample includes 71.9% males, 27.4% females,
and 0.4% others. Age ranges from 23 to 73 (M = 47.99,
SD = 12.85). All three divisions are represented (33.3%
Consumer & Safety, 34.7% Veterinary & Import, 32%
Agriculture & Nature). Work experience varies between
1 and 43 years (M = 16.27, SD = 11.22). The sample was
representative (Table 2). The respondents in the sample
only had slightly lower years of work experience than
the total population (M = 21.3), which should be con-
sidered when interpreting the findings.
Measurement scale: Preparation and analysis
A two-phase approach was used to develop and validate
the measurement scale for street-level enforcement
style (DeVellis, 2016). The two phases consist of pre-
paration and analysis (van Engen, 2017b).
For the preparation, DeVellis (2016) measurement
development guidelines were followed. First, a
preliminary item pool was generated by adapting
items created by Lo et al. (2009), but also adding to it
by building on other scholars who have quantitatively
measured street-level enforcement style (Mascini &
Wijk, 2009; May & Winter, 1999, 2000). This resulted
in five items for each dimension (25 in total). This item
pool is larger than the expected final scale, which is
common practice, since it allows the researcher to
identify the most optimal combination of items
(DeVellis, 2016; van Engen, 2017a). All items were
measured on a 10-point scale ranging from completely
disagree (1) until completely agree (10). Second, the
item pool was reviewed by experts (n = 11) to evaluate
face validity. Interviewed experts included five senior
staffers composed of middle and upper management
and six inspectors. After revising the items several
times, the experts recognized that the 25-item scale
measured the different dimensions of enforcement
style and were formulated appropriately for the
enforcement context.
Table 2. Sample and population characteristics.
Sample (n = 507) Population (n = 1201)
Age (M) 48.99 49.0
Years’ work experience (M) 16.27 21.30
Female (%) 27.40 28.73
Male (%) 71.90 71.27
Other gender (%) 0.40 -
Note: No data are available on other genders for the total populations.
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For analysis, the statistical program R and packages
“lavaan” (Rosseel, 2011), “psych” (Revelle, 2014),
“semTools” (Pornprasertmanit, Miller, Schoemann, &
Rosseel, 2013) were used to conduct factor analysis and
establish internal consistency reliability as well as con-
struct validity (DeVellis, 2016; van Engen, 2017b). The
data slightly diverge from multivariate normality. This
does not pose a problem for parameter estimates if it is
accounted for (Field, 2013). Consequently, the Satorra-
Bentler correction for the maximum likelihood estima-
tion was used to calculate the parameters (Satorra &
Bentler, 1994). Following Osborne & Fitzpatrick (2012),
internal replication was used to ensure the findings are
robust and, therefore, the sample was randomly split in
half (1n = 253; 2n = 254). The first half was used for
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and the second half
for confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Reliability was
tested by examining model fit statistics and McDonald’s
omega. Finally, construct validity was assessed by test-
ing the internal, convergent–and discriminant validity
by relating enforcement style to theoretically related
and unrelated measured constructs.
Results
Exploratory factor analysis
The first half of the data (n = 253) was used to conduct
the exploratory factor analysis. Oblique rotation was used
since factors were expected to correlate (Field, 2013). A
total of 12 items were excluded. This is in line with the
general rule of thumb that the tested preliminary item
pool is at least twice the size of the final scale (van Engen,
2017a). First, three items were omitted. These items were
reverse coded, but the factors they loaded on could not be
explained theoretically. It is, therefore, likely that respon-
dents failed to attend to the positive-negative wording due
to the limited number of reverse coded items. To limit
method bias, the three items were omitted (DeVellis,
2016; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).
Second, eight additional items were omitted because
they had factor loadings below .4 or cross-loadings
above .3 (Field, 2013).
Based on the scree plot and theoretical interpreta-
tions of factors, the EFA results in a three-factor
model instead of the expected five-factor model
(Field, 2013). Table 3 shows the full wording of each
item using a template. Underlined words are generic
words that can be adjusted and replaced as necessary
to fit the context of other studies (van Engen et al.,
2016). The three factors are: (1) legal, (2) facilitation,
and (3) accommodation. Each factor is a separate
dimension that street-level behavior can vary on. An
inspector’s enforcement style is, then, made up of the
way s/he varies along the three dimensions. Notably,
rather than being individual dimensions, both form-
alism and coercion (factor 1), as well as prioritization
and educational (factor 2) collapse and make up one
latent construct each.
First, while May & Winter (1999); May & Winter
(2000)) separate formalism and coercion this study shows
they are interconnected. The first factor is composed of
three formalism items and two coercion items and labeled
the legal dimension. The legal dimension is revealed to be
defined by the extent to which attention is paid to an
inspector to the rigidness and force of the law. Second, the
prioritization and education enforcement dimension also
make up one factor as opposed to the expected two (Lo
et al., 2009). The second factor is composed of three educa-
tional items and one prioritization item. This factor is
labeled the facilitation dimension because it is composed
of both the helping aspect highlighted in the educational
dimension and forgiving which is part of prioritization.
Finally, the accommodation dimension formed—as
expected—one of the factors.
Confirmatory factor analysis
The second half of the dataset (n = 254) was used to
perform the CFA. The fit of the model was assessed
using the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis
Table 3. EFA with oblique rotated factor loadings.
Item F1 F2 F3
Legal dimension (ω = .80)
During client encounters, I focus on:
1 Implementing policy X by following the letter of
the law
0.67
2 That I enforce in an unambiguous way 0.78
3 That I make strict agreements with clients 0.69
4 That I execute the client encounter as completely
as possible
0.73
5 That I uphold high standards regarding clients’
compliance with rules and regulations
0.80
Facilitation dimension (ω = .85)
During client-encounters, I focus on:
1 Transferring my professional knowledge to clients 0.76
2 Giving indications how to improve compliance to
clients
0.79
3 Being as helpful as possible to clients 0.90
4 The circumstances of clients that I encounter 0.63
Accommodation dimension (ω = .83)
During client encounters, I consider:
1 The opinions about government task A of
colleagues from my team
0.80
2 The opinions about government task A of other
teams
0.91
3 The opinions about government task A of other
clients
0.65
4 The opinions about government task A of my
team leader
0.62
Note: In this study, the general underlined term clients is replaced by
inspectee, government task A is replaced by inspecting, policy X by
intervention policy, and client encounter by inspection(s).
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index (TLI), the root mean square error of approxima-
tion (RMSEA), and the standardized root mean square
residual (SRMR). Cut-off criteria are between ≥ .95
(good fit) and ≥ .90 (moderate fit) for CFI and TLI,
between ≤ .06 (good fit) and ≤ .08 (moderate fit) for
RMSEA and, finally, ≤ .08 (good fit) for SRMR (Hu &
Benter, 1999). The model (χ2 = 99.191, df = 62). The
model fit was good with CFI = .929, TLI = .911,
RSMEA = .052, PCLOSE = .385, and SRMR = .066.
Descriptive statistics
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics. It is noteworthy
that inspectors’ street-level enforcement style is, in gen-
eral, mostly legal in nature (M = 8.01) followed by
facilitation (M = 7. 36). Inspectors also have a consid-
erable accommodation enforcement style (M = 6.08)
although the mean is considerably lower than for the
other two dimensions.
Internal consistency reliability tests
The internal consistency reliability of a measurement
scale concerns the homogeneity of items (DeVellis,
2016). The internal consistency reliability was tested
using the model fit indices mentioned above and
McDonald’s omega. First and foremost, as mentioned
earlier all fit indices pass the recommended thresholds
indicating good internal consistency reliability. Second,
the EFA resulted in a three-factor model. The proposed
measure was assessed for reliability using McDonald’s
omega which is more sensible and less prone to over,
and underestimation than the highly-critiqued
Cronbach’s alpha (Dunn, Baguley, & Brunsden, 2014;
Sijtsma, 2009). Reliability for all three factors was above
the .7 threshold (ω = .80 (factor 1), ω = .85 (factor 2),
and ω = .83 (factor 3) indicating good reliability
(Table 3).
Construct validity tests
Construct validity addresses the extent to which the
underlying latent construct—here street-level enforce-
ment style—“behaves the way the construct it purports
to measure should behave” (DeVellis, 2016, p. 95). The
internal construct validity is assessed first, followed by
convergent and discriminant validity (DeVellis, 2016).
Internal construct validity
The three factors all measure a different dimension of
the latent construct of enforcement style. It is therefore
expected that they correlate. Table 5 shows that the legal,
facilitation, and accommodation dimension all positively
correlate and are, thus, related but distinguishable.
Correlations are strongest between facilitation and
accommodation (r = 0.30) and weakest between legal
and accommodation (r = 0.16). That all dimensions
positively correlate is in line with theories on street-
level enforcement style which indicate that none of
these styles are going to be solely present. Inspectors
will combine the different dimensions during inspectee
encounters and vary concerning the extent to which
each dimension is internalized. These different combina-
tions of variations make up an individuals’ street-level
enforcement style (Lo et al., 2009; Mascini & van Wijk,
2009; May & Winter, 2000; May & Wood, 2003).
Convergent construct validity
Convergent validity assesses the extent to which pre-
dicted related constructs are indeed related (DeVellis,
2016). The three dimensions of street-level enforcement
style were theorized to be related to three constructs
(perceived trust in inspectees’ compliance, years of
work experience, and rule obedience). Trust is percep-
tion-based, because perceptions of inspectors inform
their regulatory practices and, thus, their enforcement
styles (Pautz & Rinfret, 2011). Different relations are
expected for each of the three dimensions and the
related constructs, because inspectors will employ dif-
ferent combinations of the underlying dimensions of
street-level enforcement styles during interactions with
inspectees. Each dimension, thus, has a distinct nature
(Lo et al., 2009; Mascini & van Wijk, 2009; May &
Winter, 2000; May & Wood, 2003). See Appendix I
for an overview of all measures and response categories.
Perceived trust in inspectees’ performance. The
character of the relationship between inspectees and
inspectors influences street-level enforcement style
(Nielsen, 2007; Pautz & Wamsley, 2012). Contrary to
the New Public Management model, which is built
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of dimensions of enforcement
style.
Enforcement style dimension Min. Max. M SD
Legal 1 10 8.01 1.03
Facilitation 1 10 7.36 1.32
Accommodation 1 10 6.08 1.94
Table 5. Internal construct validity.
1 2 3
1 Legal 1
2 Facilitation 0.24*** 1
3 Accommodation 0.16** 0.30*** 1
***p < .001; **p < .05
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around a lack of trust between principals and agents
(Bouckaert, 2012), there is a trusting relation between
inspectees and inspectors (Pautz & Wamsley, 2012).
Despite the lack of substantive empirical evidence,
there seems to be consensus in the literature that
more trusting inspectors favor a flexible and facilitating
approach during encounters with inspectees (May &
Winter, 1999, 2000; Pautz & Wamsley, 2012). May &
Winter (2000) emphasize that inspectors with a helpful
approach “trust regulatees and sympathize with the
difficulties they face in attempting to comply with reg-
ulations” (149). A positive relationship is, therefore,
expected between an inspectors’ trust in an inspectees’
compliance and the facilitation dimension of enforce-
ment style (Pautz, 2010; Pautz & Rinfret, 2011; Pautz &
Wamsley, 2012). The results in Table 5 confirm the
predicted relation (st.B = 0.155). This, indeed, suggests
that the consensus of the relation between trust and a
facilitative approach during face-to-face inspection
visits (Pautz, 2010; Pautz & Rinfret, 2011; Pautz &
Wamsley, 2012) is, indeed, supported by empirical
evidence.
Years of work experience. In addition to the character
of inspector-inspectee relations, it has long been
acknowledged that individual characteristics of inspec-
tors matter for the way they enforce (e.g. Hawkins,
1984; Gormley, 1998). Hawkins (1984), for instance,
showed that the older the inspectors, the more flexible
they were. Likewise, Kaufmann (2017) emphasize that
inspectors with little work experience exhibit “a more
policing, nit-picking attitude” than colleagues with
more years of work experience. The newer inspectors
do not have the confidence yet to determine which
violations and risks can be overlooked and where they
can be facilitating (Kaufmann, 2017; Hawkins, 1984). In
this line of reasoning, a positive relationship is expected
between years of work experience and the facilitation
enforcement style dimension. Table 5 confirms that
older inspectors are more comfortable with providing
advice and sympathizing with the circumstances of
inspectees (facilitation dimension) than their younger
colleagues (st.B = 0.202).
Rule obedience. Next to demographic characteristics
like years or work experience, personality characteristics
matter for street-level enforcement style. It is expected
that inspectors who are very rule obedient will apply the
legal and accommodation dimension more extensively.
First, rule obedience is a personality characteristic and
inspectors possessing this will be more comfortable with
being strict and formal (van Kleef, Schott, & Steen,
2015). It is, therefore, hypothesized that there is a
positive relationship between the legal dimension and
an inspectors’ rule obedience. Second, reliable judgments
are central to the legitimacy of regulators (Tujin,
Janssens, Robben, & Van Den Bergh, 2012). Rule-obedi-
ent inspectors are hypothesized to be more accommo-
dative because they turn to other stakeholders, like their
team leaders and colleagues, for support on how to make
judgments and, in turn, enforce (Maynard-Moody &
Musheno, 2000). Table 5 shows that both expectations
are confirmed (st.B = 0.308 and st.B = 0.134,
respectively).
Discriminant validity
Discriminant validity assesses whether expected unre-
lated constructs are, indeed, unrelated (DeVellis, 2016).
Two unrelated constructs are traditional media usage
(measured in hours) and social desirability (measured
by 1 item and a 10-point scale ranging from completely
disagree to completely agree). Table 6 shows that both
constructs are, indeed, not correlated with all three
dimensions of street-level enforcement style.
Conclusion and discussion
Understanding street-level enforcement is important
for understanding policy implementation (May &
Wood, 2003). This study has both a theoretical and
methodological point of departure. Theoretically,
there is an unsolved conceptual puzzle concerning the
nature and number of dimensions underlying street-
level enforcement style. Methodologically, there is a
lack of a validated and psychometrically sound mea-
surement scale which complicates cross-sector and
cross-national comparisons. This study investigates
and operationalizes street-level enforcement style by
building on the classic work of May & Winter (1999);
May & Winter (2000) and the more recent work of Lo
et al. (2009). By revealing three dimensions underlying
street-level enforcement style (legal, facilitation, and
accommodation), this study contributes to a deeper
Table 6. Convergent and discriminant validity.
Street-level enforcement style
dimensions
Legal Facilitation Accommodation
Convergent validity
Trust in inspectees’ compliance 0.035 0.155* −0.039
Rule obedience 0.308*** 0.031 0.134*
Years’ work experience −0.053 0.202** −0.077
Discriminant validity
Traditional media usage 0.027 −0.083 0.044
Social desirability −0.013 −0.073 0.084
The standardized coefficients from the Structural Equation Model (SEM) are
reported.
***p < .00; **p < .05; *p < .01
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understanding of street-level enforcement behavior
generally and takes the first step toward understanding
individual variations specifically.
Theoretically, this study contributes knowledge on
how we can understand street-level behavior, and
specifically enforcement style by addressing its under-
lying dimensions (May & Winter, 2011). This study,
thus, conceptually contributes to the concept of enfor-
cement style. While May & Winter (1999); May &
Winter (2000)) and May & Wood (2003) argue for a
two-dimensional conceptualization, Lo et al. (2009)
advocates a five-dimensional underpinning of enforce-
ment style. The findings of the measurement develop-
ment and validation analysis in this study adds to this
dimensionality discussion and shows that—in a
Western context—street-level enforcement style is
composed of three dimensions. First, the legal dimen-
sion is constructed of both the rigidness (formalism)
and force of the law (coercion) (Kagan, 1994; Lo et al.,
2009; May & Winter, 1999, 2000; May & Wood, 2003).
This finding is in line with the original notion of a
punitive and legal style and, sub-sequentially, applying
rules rigidly (Kagan, 1994). Kagan (1994), ultimately,
argues that formalism and coercion make up the same
construct. Notably, this study shows that the legal
dimension is revealed to not solely consist of variations
in flexibility of applying rules (Kagan, 1994), but also of
the extent of the emphasis inspectors put on being rigid
and strict (Kagan, 1994; May & Wood, 2003) as well as
their degree of threatening with sanctions and conse-
quences for noncompliant behavior (Lo et al., 2009;
May & Winter, 1999, 2000).
The second dimension is facilitation which encom-
passes the communicative function (educational) of the
law while considering circumstances at hand (prioritiza-
tion) (Lo et al., 2009; May &Wood, 2003). This finding is
in line with previous research. According toMay &Wood
(2003) one of the dimensions of street-level enforcement
style is facilitation which encompasses helping and for-
giving inspectees. The educational enforcement dimen-
sion entails the extent of the communicative function of
the law and providing information to inspectees (Lo et al.,
2009). Sharing information signals a positive relationship
fostering cooperation and, thus, a way of helping (e.g.
Bruijn et al., 2007; Etienne, 2013; Nielsen, 2007). In addi-
tion, prioritization is a dimension composed of the extent
of accounting for contextual circumstances of inspectees
(Lo et al., 2009). Paying attention during inspections to
the situations of inspectees can be seen as forgiving (May
& Wood, 2003). In sum, though May & Wood (2003) do
not explicitly study it, they state that helping and forgiving
are at the heart of facilitation. The second factor revealed
in this study empirically confirms this idea.
Finally, accommodation addresses the extent to which
inspectors consider opinions of other stakeholders, like
their team leaders when conducting inspection visits (Lo
et al., 2009). First and foremost, by empirically identifying
this third dimension, the present study confirms that May
&Winter (2011) were correct to point out that street-level
enforcement style is more complex than originality
thought; and consequently, indeed, best captured in
more than two dimensions (Lo et al., 2009).
Furthermore, the accommodation dimension is in line
with Maynard-Moody & Musheno’s (2000) notion that
street-level workers are inherently connected to peers.
Though the interactions street-level bureaucrats have
with inspectees determine how they implement policies,
it is the relationship with their fellow street-level workers
which shapes their attitude and support their ways of
dealing with inspectees. Notably, as opposed to the legal
and facilitation dimension, accommodation is more
cognitive in nature. Future research could explore roles
of other external stakeholders for the enforcement styles
of street-level bureaucrats (e.g. de Boer et al., 2018; de
Boer and Eshuis, in press) or study variations within the
enforcement style of inspectors and other cognitive beha-
viors (e.g. Tummers et al., 2015).
The legal, facilitation, and accommodation enforcement
style dimensions were also theoretically related to indivi-
dual-level characteristics of the street-level bureaucrat,
namely (1) perceived trust in inspectees’ performance; (2)
years of work experience; and (3) rule obedience. The
convergent validity tests showed that individual antece-
dents of inspectors positively correlate with different
dimensions of enforcement style. This could have impor-
tant consequences for scholars investigating street-level
enforcement style variation. This study adds to the growing
body of research showing that individual-level antecedents
such as demographics (Hawkins, 1984; Kaufmann, 2017),
trust, and other relational aspects of inspector-inspectee
interactions (Etienne, 2013; Pautz, 2010; Pautz & Rinfret,
2011; Pautz & Wamsley, 2012) as well as personality traits
like rule obedience (van Kleef et al., 2015) may potentially
help explain enforcement style variations. Future research
investigating individual antecedents in relation to inspectee
encounters can, thus, be especially fruitful for understand-
ing street-level enforcement styles.
Methodologically, this study answers to the increasing
number of articles calling for creating high qualitymeasure-
ment scales (e.g. Grimmelikhuijsen & Knies, 2017; van
Engen, 2017b; van Engen et al., 2016; Van Loon, Leisink,
Knies, & Brewer, 2016). The street-level enforcement scale
at hand, ultimately, enables scholars to study this concept
systematically across sectors and countries and investigate
the extent of its effects. In other words, future studies are
urged to further explore the three enforcement style
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dimensions across different types of street-level bureau-
crats, its antecedents and its effects at the street-level.
Scholars can, for instance, investigate the effects of street-
level enforcement style of other street-level bureaucrats on
ways of implementing public policies (Mascini & Wijk,
2009) and their interactions with inspectees (de Boer
et al., 2018; de Boer & Eshuis, in press; Etienne, 2013;
Pautz &Wamsley, 2012).
Despite the theoretical and methodological contribu-
tions, this study has limitations. First and foremost, the
data collected here are cross-sectionalmaking the establish-
ment of causal inferences impossible. Making causal infer-
ences is not the goal of this study and more research is
needed to fully grasp the causal implications of the correla-
tions found in the convergent and discriminant tests of this
study. Second, street-level enforcement style is situational
and, thus, differs across individual-inspectee encounters,
sectors, and countries. Notably, a Western population was
used in this sample. Lo et al. (2009) street-level enforcement
style study was tested in an Asian context because they
surveyed Chinese inspectors. The Chinese regulatory con-
text is seen as more authoritarian than theWestern context
(Rooij et al., 2013; Zhan et al., 2013; Zhang, 2016). The role
of Chinese inspectors and their behavior during interac-
tions with inspectees may, thus, differ from inspectors
operating in a Western context, but there could also be
similarities. Future research should study cross-national
similarities and differences concerning the three dimen-
sions underpinning street-level enforcement style or com-
pare across sectors within one country or individual
encounters as well as its implications for implementation
of enforcement policies.
Finally, this measurement scale is validated using a spe-
cific kind of street-level bureaucrat, namely the inspector.
Regardless, many other street-level bureaucrats implement
enforcement policies, like police officers (e.g. Engel &
Worden, 2003). In addition, a large portion of street-level
bureaucrats may arguably deal with fewer rules (Maynard-
Moody & Musheno, 2000) but may still have to enforce
public policies such as parole officers. More research is
needed to understand the way other type of street-level
bureaucrats enforce at the street-level and how they com-
bine the three dimensions during different encounters with
inspectees. In this way, amore thorough understanding can
be established of similarities and differences in street-level
enforcement styles.
All in all, street-level enforcement style is more complex
than is commonly proposed (May & Winter, 1999, 2000,
2011). Studies aiming to investigate street-level enforce-
ment style can benefit from taking its three-dimensional
nature into account and advancing it. Using the developed
and validated 13-item measure will allow for cross-sector
and cross-national comparisons which, ultimately, ensures
a better understanding of how street-level enforcement
style ismade up and how it can bemeasured systematically.
Note
1 Formalism is conceptualized in the social sciences in
different ways. In the political sciences, it is frequently
referred to as the gap between what is said formally and
what is actually executed in practice (e.g. Farazmand,
2012; Riggs, 1994). In this article, the conceptualization
of formalism used by scholars specifically investigating
street-level enforcement style is used.
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Appendix I. Items used in questionnaire
Construct Item(s) Measure
Perceived
organizational
effectiveness
(ω = .83;
α = .82)
My division is successful in:
(1) Tracing violations of rules
and regulations
(2) Ensuring companies comply
with rules and regulations
(3) Monitoring risks
(4) Reducing risks
10-point scale
with:
1 = completely
disagree
10 = completely
agree
Perceived trust I would typify my degree of trust
in inspectees concerning their
compliance as:
10-point scale
with:
1 = low trust
10 = high trust
Rule obedience In general, I am someone who
follows the rules even if I disagree
with them
10-point scale
with:
1 = completely
disagree
10 = completely
agree
Work experience How many years have you been
employed at the NVWA (or a
predecessor of the NVWA)?
Filled in years
Traditional
media usage
How many hours do you spend
using traditional media per day?
Filled in hours
Social
desirability
I am always willing to admit to a
mistake
10-point scale
with:
1 = completely
disagree
10 = completely
agree
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